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Abstract 
This thesis discusses the role for states and centralised government policies in development 
intervention. The topic is explored through a case study of India’s Targeted Public Distribution 
System (TPDS), a large-scale government intervention to enhance food security among India’s 
poorest households. The central questions of the study were, firstly, which function TPDS 
serves in the lives of beneficiary households in terms of food security and vulnerability, and 
secondly, what the study of TPDS can tell about the potential of government programmes in 
contributing to community development. Qualitative fieldwork was conducted in two districts 
in the Indian state Odisha through observations, interviews and conversations with 
beneficiaries, project implementers and government officials. The findings suggest that TPDS – 
despite being flawed with corruption and targeting errors – is bringing a certain level of food 
security and resilience to beneficiary households. It is found that the boundaries between the 
state and society become blurred in the delivery of TPDS and that embedded relations 
between implementers and beneficiaries contribute to basic needs being met at the household 
level. Following from this, the thesis argues in favour of a central role for the state in 
development, while also emphasising the need for society cooperation and involvement. 
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1. Introduction 
Strategies for eradicating poverty and increasing levels of human development change as 
lessons are learnt and new paths discovered. Since the 1970s, a participatory approach has 
gradually gained ground within the field of development, challenging orthodox ideas of 
capitalism and its emphasis on economic growth and industrial progress. These new ideas 
entered mainstream thinking in the 1990s with the works of Robert Chambers and others, 
stressing the need for development to be decentralised, participatory and based on local 
needs (Tandon 2000:320-323). The rather top-down structure and centralised character of 
past development policy has thus, to a large extent, been replaced by a more people-centred 
approach. There is now a larger emphasis on community participation, small-scale 
development is preferred over large-scale approaches, and the margins of society have 
become a central focus in many development interventions. In this way, the value of the 
bottom-up approach has become generally accepted, the role of the non-governmental sector 
has changed and community organisations (COs) have come to play an increasingly prominent 
role (ibid). 
Within this framework, it is appropriate to ask what the role of states and centralised 
government policies should be; and further, whether large-scale programmes implemented 
from above can facilitate development that reflects local needs on the ground. This topic will 
be discussed and exemplified in the present thesis through a case study of India’s Targeted 
Public Distribution System (TPDS), which is a nationwide policy intervention aimed at 
enhancing food security among India’s poorest households. TPDS is the largest welfare 
programme within India and has a high degree of government control. As such, it provides an 
interesting case for the study of the role of the state in development. Accordingly, the purpose 
of the thesis is to discuss the potential for state intervention in community development by 
exploring local experiences and perceptions of TPDS. The findings from India will thus feed into 
the larger development debate and provide a foundation upon which to consider the place 
and responsibility of states within a field characterised by a multitude of other stakeholders 
with local knowledge and specialised capacities. 
Two months of fieldwork in the Indian state of Odisha make up the empirical foundation of the 
thesis. Data was collected through a comparative case study in two districts of the state, 
Rayagada and Khordha, allowing for the discovery of patterns crosscutting the two contexts. 
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The research questions guiding the thesis read: 
 Which function does TPDS serve in the lives of beneficiary households in Rayagada and 
Khordha districts, in terms of providing food security and reducing vulnerability? 
 What can the case study of TPDS tell us about the potential of large-scale, government 
programmes in contributing to community development? 
The first question is explorative in nature and closely linked to the empirical findings from the 
field. The concepts of food security and vulnerability frame this part of the analysis and 
provide a lens through which to understand local realities in the study context. In order to fully 
gauge the function of TPDS, the thesis also enters the debate on the future of India’s food 
policies by exploring the opinions of beneficiaries on a widely regarded government proposal 
to replace TPDS with a direct cash transfer (DCT) scheme. Thus, by hypothetically challenging 
the current status quo, interesting views are uncovered on what such changes could mean to 
beneficiary households. The second research question places the case study within a wider 
developmental frame by using the findings from the field analytically and discussing the role of 
state intervention in development. The notion of state-society synergy, as coined by Peter 
Evans (1997), guides this part of the analysis. 
In the following section, the empirical context of the study is explained and TPDS introduced. 
The third section outlines the methodology of data collection and analysis. The fourth section 
elaborates on the analytical framework for the thesis, outlining the key concepts of food 
security, vulnerability and state-society synergy. The fifth and sixth sections present the two 
analytical discussions to answer the research questions of the thesis, first addressing the 
function of TPDS for beneficiary households in terms of food security and vulnerability, 
secondly exploring the role for the state in development in terms of state-society synergy. 
Hence, the empirical discussion of the food securing and vulnerability reducing aspects of TPDS 
provides a necessary foundation for the larger discussion on the potentials of state 
intervention. Finally, the thesis concludes with reflections upon the study’s contribution to a 
more comprehensive understanding of TPDS and argues in favour of a central role for the state 
in development. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Food Security and the Public Distribution System in India 
The prevalence of malnutrition in India is one of the highest in the world. Despite a national 
growth rate of 8% per year, real improvement remains to be seen in the welfare of the 
country’s poorest households. In 2010-2012, a staggering 217 million individuals were 
undernourished in India, equal to 18% of the entire population (FAO 2012). One in three of the 
world’s malnourished children live in India, and the proportion of underweight children below 
the age of five is at 43% (Naandi Foundation 2011:8). As malnourished children are less likely 
to reach their full potential, both in terms of their mental and physical capacities, the current 
food situation in India will likely impact future generations and the human development of the 
country for years to come. Malnourished children are less likely to do well at school and more 
likely to become malnourished as adults, prone to diseases and with reduced work capacity 
and economic productivity. The food security situation is thus closely intertwined with other 
indicators of development, including education, health and economic growth. The estimated 
economic losses associated with such malnutrition are currently at 3% of India’s annual GDP 
(ibid.). 
The situation is not a recent development in India. Food security has for decades been a 
concern of the Government of India (GoI) and current food policies, channelled through the so-
called Public Distribution System (PDS) reach back to the food rationing mechanisms in major 
cities during World War II. After India gained its independence, a similar system was reinstated 
through which food grains were distributed at highly subsidised prices. Since then, the GoI has 
employed PDS as a policy instrument for overcoming food shortages, stabilising food prices 
and securing consumption among the country’s poorest people (Srinivas & Thaha 2004:1). The 
system has undergone changes throughout the years and has become an important tool of the 
Government for managing India’s food economy.  
As a response to drought and food shortages in the mid-sixties, PDS was made universal in the 
1970s and came to be a central component of India’s national strategy to reduce poverty. This 
meant that all households across India were entitled to fixed rations of selected commodities. 
It gradually became evident, however, that the universal delivery of subsidies largely failed in 
reaching the population below the poverty line (BPL). Large proportions of the subsidies ended  
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with the non-poor and problems of leakage due to widespread corruption and storage losses 
were also common (Srinivas & Thaha 2004:14). In view of these issues, universal PDS was 
replaced with a targeted policy in 1997. This Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) 
differentiates between BPL and above poverty line (APL) households and offers different 
quantities of commodities and different rates for members of the two categories 
(Swaminathan 2008:50-51). A network of 477,000 fair price shops (FPSs) and Gram Panchayat 
(GP)1 offices serve as distribution points across India, from where subsidised commodities, 
including rice, wheat, sugar and kerosene, are sold to entitled households by locally appointed 
shopkeepers. Reaching more than 160 million households, TPDS has become the largest 
welfare programme within India and is the largest of its kind in the world (IPCIG 2011). 
The system is operated as a joint responsibility between the GoI and State Governments. 
Today, the GoI oversees the entire value chain, from procurement to milling, storage, 
transportation and allocation of food grains to the State Governments. The State Governments 
have the responsibility of distributing the commodities to TPDS beneficiaries, including 
identification of eligible households, issuing of ration cards and supervision of the delivery 
through FPSs. This means that the system is ultimately managed at the state and district levels 
and the implementation of TPDS can therefore differ between states in terms of the 
commodities offered, the size of entitlements and the price set (Swaminathan 2008:51). 
Despite structural changes, issues of inefficiency and corruption remain, and the transition 
from universal PDS to TPDS has entailed substantial exclusion errors, as genuinely deprived 
households are now being excluded at large scale. The problem lies in the categorisation of 
households and in the inevitable fact that limiting benefits to one target group will lead to the 
exclusion of others. If the selected criteria for inclusion do not adequately reflect the reality on 
the ground, some vulnerable households will be excluded from the system. Beneficiary 
households have been identified through government censuses conducted in 1997 and 20022,3 
according to income levels. Today, the findings from these surveys still provide the foundation 
for the subsidies given through TPDS (Alkire & Seth 2013:49). This is problematic for a number 
of reasons. First, household changes cannot be captured if continual reassessments are not 
                                                                  
1
 Local political bodies at the village level. 
2
 The 2002 survey was heavily critisised for corruption, poor research design, low data quality and 
coverage, which resulted in some states not adopting the new BPL list. In effect, some states still rely on 
data from 1997 (Khera 2011:39-40; Alkire & Seth 2013:49). 
3
 A new census is currently underway, based on data collected in 2011 (Alkire & Seth 2013). 
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regularly conducted. Second, incomes are difficult to estimate and household categories are 
determined at the risk of excluding households that are genuinely poor. Third, APL households 
can also be vulnerable, especially if their wages rank just above the poverty line (Swaminathan 
2002:44). Finally, research shows that current poverty caps would vary significantly if they 
reflected the multiple dimensions of poverty, rather than relying on income as the sole 
indicator (Alkire & Seth 2013). 
The targeting of PDS has proved to be a complicated matter and the process of separating the 
poor from the non-poor has not only been costly and inefficient; it has also failed to eradicate 
the problems of corruption. Leakages to the black market are substantial, fuelled by officials 
using their positions for their own benefit as well as by FPS owners seeking to maximise their 
economic output (Nagavarapu & Sekhri 2011:2). Accordingly, take-up rates have been low in 
many states, and the intended beneficiaries have only received a fraction of the Government’s 
TPDS spending. 
Research indicates improvement in TPDS programme performance within recent years. Still, 
considerable exclusion errors persist and corruption is proving difficult to eliminate (ibid.). 
Consequently, most research on TPDS has focused exactly on these issues while other 
questions of equally high importance, such as the nutritional impact of TPDS or its role in 
providing food security, have remained largely unexplored (Khera 2011:36). TPDS therefore 
remains the object of heavy criticism from many sides, while its food securing capacities are 
unknown. This situation creates the backdrop to a debate that has emerged about the future 
of TPDS where DCTs are discussed as an alternative option. 
2.1.1 The Cash Transfer Debate 
It is a common belief in policy debates and academic circles that TPDS is irreparably 
dysfunctional as a tool to increase food security across India. DCTs have been suggested as an 
alternative, leading to an intense debate that has engaged stakeholders at all levels, including 
politicians, government officials, academics, COs, international organisations and the media. 
Two main camps have emerged, the first proposing to replace the current system entirely with 
a DCT scheme. The second camp wishes to preserve the overall structure of TPDS but 
introduce reforms to increase transparency and efficiency in its delivery (Navagarapu & Sekhri 
2011:3-4). Recently, a government proposal to replace TPDS and other subsidies with DCTs has 
intensified the debate.  
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DCTs will initially be rolled out to cover relatively minor transfers such as scholarships and 
pensions, while the replacement of larger items such as food, fertiliser and fuel subsidies is 
allegedly still in the pipeline (The Hindu 2013). 
Proponents suggest that the introduction of DCTs would bring many advantages to poor 
households, including that (1) transfers would be considerably larger than the transfers 
embedded in TPDS, (2) operational costs would be lower, (3) corruption and leakages would 
decrease, and (4) financial inclusion would be expanded, strengthening the consumer 
economy (Svedberg 2012:59; Sengupta & Mukherjee 2012:19-20). To support the case, 
proponents argue that DCTs have proved highly successful in reducing poverty and improving 
welfare in other countries, including Brazil and Mexico. Brazil’s Bolsa Familia is often 
highlighted, as it has been effective in reducing poverty and increasing access to food, health 
and education by making cash transfers conditional on issues such as school attendance and 
health check-ups (Sahoo 2013). 
Critics argue, however, that the Indian context is not comparable to that of Brazil or Mexico 
and that the situation is not ripe for replacing food subsidies with cash transfers (Acharya 
2011). The overarching concern is that a change to DCTs might lead to an increase in alcohol 
consumption, increased gender inequality and domestic violence, and increased vulnerability 
to inflation and fluctuations of market prices. Other concerns include the capacity of local 
banking infrastructure to deal with DCTs and the lack of access to bank accounts among poor 
people (Rao 2013:4; Sengupta & Mukherjee 2012:19-23; Svedberg 2012:59-60). India already 
has a range of DCT programmes and many opponents of replacing TPDS with DCTs recognise 
the potential value of such schemes. However, in terms of food it is argued that DCTs would 
not in the same way contribute to food security at the household level (Puri 2012). 
Although concerns are voiced about the way a change to DCTs might affect livelihoods and 
social structures, a limited number of empirical studies have been conducted to support such 
claims (exceptions are Khera 2011 and Puri 2012). More research attention therefore needs to 
be paid to beneficiaries and the potential implications that the replacement of TPDS by DCTs 
might have for their livelihoods. The findings of this thesis contribute to filling this gap. 
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2.2 TPDS and Food Security in Odisha 
With a population of 41.9 million, a low 
population density and a predominantly rural 
population (87%), Odisha is one of India’s 
poorest states (DFPB 2011). Annual per capita 
income is estimated to be 33% less than the 
national average, and the state has been 
ranked among the bottom five on the Human 
Development Index for India’s major states 
since 1981 (ESAF 2007:18). More than 65% of 
the total workforce and 80% of the workforce 
in rural areas depend on agriculture for their 
livelihood. Subsistence farming and 
smallholdings predominate and extensive 
poverty prevails with an estimated 46% of the population living below the poverty line (ibid; 
Economic Times 2009). A very high proportion (90%) of the population is engaged in the 
informal sector and many people earn daily wages as casual or agricultural labourers. The 
literacy rate is low, particularly among women, while infant and maternal mortality is high, 
incidences of severe malnutrition are frequent and standards in both health and education are 
poor (ESAF 2007:27). 
A combination of social, economic, institutional and ecological factors has placed Odisha in the 
category of severely food insecure regions. High levels of poverty, income disparity, limited 
employment opportunities and occurrences of floods and droughts are all factors that 
contribute to food insecurity in the state (CES 2011:3)4. 
Food security and rural development are thus important issues for the Government of Odisha 
(GoO) and TPDS is central to the work implemented by officials at the block and district levels5. 
Through TPDS, the GoO receives allotments from the GoI, which are subdivided first at the 
district and later at the block level. Currently, the GoO distributes commodities according to 
the numbers outlined in Figure 2: 
                                                                  
4
 See Appendix 1 for a map of food insecurity in Odisha. 
5
 See Appendix 2 for a chart of administrative units in India. 
Figure 1: Location of Odisha in India  
(Source: Wikimedia Commons 2013) 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
The research has been informed by an interpretative-constructivist standpoint and the choice 
of methods for data collection and analysis has been guided by an inductive approach. This 
bodes well with the focus on local realities and the importance ascribed to individual 
experiences in the study. Hence, the thesis does not seek to generalise its findings to other 
contexts. 
In order to add depth to the findings, a comparative case study design was chosen. 
Comparative case studies examine differing cases within a common framework, detecting both 
what is shared and what is particular, and analyses behavioural patterns and relationships (Yin 
2009:68). Fieldwork was conducted in Rayagada and Khordha districts of Odisha, which make 
up two interesting cases for investigating TPDS. The former is a poor tribal area, home to a 
pilot project to curb inefficiency and corruption in TPDS8, while the latter is home to the state 
capital and a good example of how food is delivered through TPDS in most districts in the 
                                                                  
6
 In 2001, a sub-category to BPL was introduced in order to specifically target the most vulnerable 
households. It was termed “Antyodaya Anna Yojana” (AAY), “the poorest of the poor” (Nagavarapu & 
Sekhri 2011:6). 
7
 KBK refers to Kalahandi, Balangir and Koraput and groups the poorest districts in Odisha, all 
experiencing extreme to severe food insecurity.  APL households in KBK districts receive rice in addition 
to wheat and kerosene (GoO 2013:12). 
8
 The thesis does not explicitly consider this pilot project, as no differences were found relevant to the 
research questions. 
 ENTITLEMENT OF COMMODITIES PER MONTH  
Household Commodity Quantity Price/unit 
 
BPL 
Rice 25 kg Rs. 2/kg 
Sugar 2 kg Rs. 13.50/kg 
Kerosene 4 L Rs. 14.50/L 
 
AAY 
(poorest of 
the poor)
6
 
Rice 35 kg Rs. 2/kg 
Sugar 2 kg Rs. 13.50/kg 
Kerosene 4 L Rs. 14.50/L 
 
APL 
Rice (only KBK)
7
 25 kg Rs. 2/kg 
Wheat 10 kg Rs. 7/kg 
Kerosene 4 L Rs. 14.50/L 
Figure 2: Entitlement of commodities per month (Source: GoO 2013:12). 
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state. Rayagada and Khordha districts therefore constitute meaningful contrasts that enable 
the crosscutting discovery of patterns in experiences and perceptions of TPDS. The chosen 
design allows for the identification of common issues transcending the two contexts and for 
drawing “a single set of “cross-case” conclusions” (ibid.:20). Accordingly, in the analysis, the 
two cases will not be separated and viewed in isolation from each other. Instead, findings that 
are reoccurring across the two contexts will be highlighted and explored. 
3.2 Data Collection 
Empirical data was collected between October and December 2012 from FPSs and GP offices in 
Rayagada and Khordha districts. Research access was gained through the World Food 
Programme (WFP). Due to the nature of the study and its focus on perceptions and 
experiences, data was exclusively collected through qualitative methods. Focus was specifically 
on local realities, and interviews with TPDS beneficiaries make up the main sources of data. In 
addition, project implementers, FPS owners and government officials were also consulted. Due 
to the nature of their jobs and their close interaction with beneficiaries they offered 
interesting insights to the study.  
3.2.1 Sampling 
In order to select participants for the study, purposive sampling methods were employed, 
allowing for strategic selection of individuals from households9 relevant to the research 
questions. The strategy of maximum variation was used to ensure diversity in the sample and 
increase its representativity (Creswell 2007:125-26). This was done to obtain an adequate 
understanding of the different experiences and perceptions of TPDS across different localities 
and characteristics. In meeting this goal, the sample consists of data from two different 
districts, from rural and urban settings, from Oryia, Telugu and tribal people10, from BPL and 
APL households, from men and women, from young and old. As such, the respondents should 
make up a representative sample of the beneficiary community. Caste was not considered, 
which, in retrospect, might have strengthened the sample and potentially have opened up for 
other interesting perspectives. The decision was taken, firstly because caste is not commonly 
considered in relation to TPDS, and secondly because some respondents directly explained 
that questions of caste were irrelevant to the study. 
                                                                  
9
 The thesis takes the household, viewed as an entity made up by its individual members, as the main 
unit of analysis. Inter-household differences between individual members are sought addressed through 
the diversity of the sample (in terms of gender, age and other characteristics). 
10
 The dominant ethnic group in Odisha is the Oriya people. Minorities include Bengali and Telugu 
people as well as a substantial number of tribes (DFPB 2011). 
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Government officials were selected through snowball sampling. In both districts, I first gained 
contact through my gatekeeper at the WFP to the district Civil Supplies Officer (CSO) who 
would subsequently introduce me to other officials relevant to the study. 
3.2.2 Interviews and Observations 
Semi-structured and conversational interviews constituted the main method of data collection. 
A total of 25 individual interviews and five focus group discussions were conducted with 
beneficiaries, roughly the same number from both districts. Each interview and focus group 
followed the same interview guide, which was gradually adjusted as analytical inferences were 
made11. In addition, five interviews were conducted with FPS owners and project 
implementers12, while informal conversational interviews were held with eight government 
officials from Rayagada and Khordha districts, ranging from CSOs and their assistants to 
Inspectors of Supplies and Block Development Officers13,14. 
Alongside qualitative interviews, observations were also carried out at different field sites, 
which helped enhance the data by uncovering meanings that were not expressed in interviews 
or conversations (Ragin 1994:92). Through observations of the distribution of rice in both 
Rayagada and Khordha districts, events and behaviours that could only be fully understood 
through direct observation were documented. This contributed to a more thorough 
understanding of the context of TPDS and the problems that can arise in its delivery. 
Observations also included following a supplies inspector at work, which allowed for rich 
observations and conversational interviews that added depth to the existing data. 
In order to ensure the anonymity of respondents and enhance the narrative flow of the thesis, 
all names have been changed and fictitious names assigned to the beneficiaries mentioned. 
For clarity, FPS owners and government officials are referred to by their titles. 
3.3 Ethical Considerations and Limitations 
Conducting interviews posed several ethical challenges. As I relied heavily on government 
officials for access to the field as well as for translation of interviews, it was important for me 
to detach myself from the Government when interacting with beneficiaries. I therefore made 
sure to stress the independence of the research and give a detailed explanation of the study’s 
                                                                  
11
 See Appendix 3. 
12
 See Appendix 4. 
13
 See Appendix 5 for a complete record of interviews. 
14
 See Appendix 2 for a chart of administrative units in India and their respective government officials. 
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purpose at the beginning of each interview. I gained informed consent and asked for 
permission to record all interviews. Further, I made sure that the respondents understood that 
they were free to ask questions or stop the interview at any time. Still, I cannot be sure that 
the translators fully captured and conveyed my intentions and independence to all 
respondents, and there is also a risk that the respondents may have felt obliged to participate 
or that they may have adjusted their answers, given the official rank of the translators and the 
inevitable power relationship between them. Similarly, I cannot know whether certain points 
were left out from the translation or whether the translators included their own opinions too. 
The situation of relying on government officials as translators thus carried a double risk of bias, 
which I sought to mitigate by taking different precautionary measures: (1) I conducted 
interviews across Rayagada and Khordha districts within different villages in each district with 
translators varying accordingly. The number of settings and different translators should 
constitute a control against the biased opinions of individual translators. (2) Whenever 
possible, a colleague from the WFP who spoke Oriya would be present and could control that 
nothing was left out by the translator. (3) I conducted three interviews in English without the 
need of a translator, two of which were in private. These interviews helped me verify what I 
had heard through translated interviews. By thus seeking multiple perspectives on the topic, 
discussing my findings with people around me and producing thick description through field 
notes and records, I sought to achieve quality data and trustworthiness in the study (Lincoln & 
Guba 1985). 
Finally, time was also a cause for ethical consideration, as I would interact with beneficiaries 
when they came to collect rice at their local FPS or GP office. This would happen in the middle 
of the day, when many were on a break from work, or in the evenings, when many were in a 
rush to get home to their families. I knew that I was taking their precious time and I therefore 
made sure to make my interview guide solid but flexible, covering certain topics and allowing 
the respondents to talk as much as they liked and had time for. In this way, some interviews 
were shorter than others, but the main issues for the study would be discussed. The 
respondents with more time would then be able to elaborate more, while shorter interviews 
often gave information to support what was said in the longer interviews. 
3.4 Data Analysis 
I started analysing the data by reading through all transcripts and field notes, assigning initial 
codes and locating themes. I then divided the codes into sub-categories, making sure that the 
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richness of the findings was reflected, and considered it in terms of patterns and concepts. In 
order to thus organise and analyse the data, Dedoose, an online tool for qualitative data 
analysis, was employed. The process helped me analyse the findings and add meaning to the 
data (Mikkelsen 2005:181-82). 
4. Theoretical Framework 
This section outlines the theoretical framework, which will be applied as an explorative point 
of reference for the analysis. The key concepts for answering the research questions of the 
thesis are discussed, starting with a definition of food security and a discussion of how the 
concept can be understood in terms of availability, access, utilisation and risk. Next, the link 
between food insecurity and vulnerability is considered and the “Asset Vulnerability 
Framework” is introduced as a way of understanding and measuring vulnerability. Finally, the 
larger debate on the role of the state in development is outlined, building on development 
governance literature and in particular the writings of Peter Evans on “state-society synergy” 
(1997). 
4.1 Food Security 
Food security as a concept originated in the 1970s and was initially concerned with global food 
supply problems, focusing on food production and population growth. As such, food security 
was understood in terms of the availability of food with focus on the volume and stability of 
food supplies (FAO 2003:26-28). Today, however, it is a well-established fact that the global 
food production is more than sufficient to feed the world’s population and a shift in the way 
food security is perceived has consequently taken place. Food security is now understood in 
terms of access to food and focus has shifted from the global level to that of households and 
individuals. In light of this, the concept has become an important component in development 
as the interlinkages between food security and poverty have been acknowledged. Today, it is 
commonly agreed that the causes of hunger lie in inequality and poverty, not in scarcity. Thus, 
adequate nutrition and food security have become key outcomes of development, while at the 
same time being crucial contributors to the development process (ODI 1997:1). 
At the World Food Summit (WFS) in 1996, a new definition was adopted to reflect this new 
thinking. It read: 
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“Food security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels, [is achieved] 
when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy 
life” (ibid.). 
The definition ascribes key importance to food access and is built on the belief that poverty is a 
main cause of food insecurity. Focus has thereby shifted towards households and their 
capability of accessing food, away from the supply orientation of the past15. Five years later, in 
2001, the definition was refined to include social as well as physical and economic access, 
building on the thoughts of Amartya Sen (1981) and the belief that poverty is a 
multidimensional issue (FAO 2003:28). Thus, food security has emerged as a multifaceted and 
cross-sectoral concept. It is a complex matter with economic, political, legal, demographic, 
cultural, social, biological and technical dimensions. Working towards ensuring food security 
therefore also implies considering a number of factors, not all directly related to food (EC 
2009:7). 
4.1.1 Dimensions of Food Security 
The WFS definition of food security is founded on three fundamental elements. These include 
availability and access, as briefly touched above, as well as appropriate food utilisation. In 
order for food security to be realised, the simultaneous fulfilment of all three dimensions is 
necessary. Availability, as we have seen, is determined by food supplies and trade. It relies on 
national agricultural production, distribution and imports as well as on adequate government 
policies (FAO 2008). Access, on the other hand, relates to the physical, economic and social 
access of individuals and households to the resources required in order to meet dietary needs. 
Adequate food supplies at the national level do not guarantee food security at the household 
level and access therefore makes up a developmentally challenging dimension of food security. 
Utilisation refers to the state of physiological well-being and should be understood in terms of 
energy and nutrient intake as well as in terms of access to clean water, sanitation and health. It 
thus underlines the link between food security and other indicators of poverty.  The 
relationship between the three dimensions is of a hierarchical nature, as “food availability is 
necessary but not sufficient for access, and access is necessary but not sufficient for utilization” 
(Webb et al. 2006:1405). They are interconnected and it is at the intersection of the three, 
when food is available, accessible and utilised appropriately, that food security is realised.  
                                                                  
15
 Whereas a parallel can be drawn from the availability view to Malthusian ideas of population growth 
and its impact on food supplies, the access view stands closer to the thoughts of Ester Boserup. She 
claimed that people increase their access to food through agricultural intensification when faced with 
the pressures of population growth (Djurfeldt 2001). 
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More recently, a fourth dimension has increasingly gained ground, namely that of risk. Risk 
refers to the risks of sudden shocks that can potentially disrupt any of the first three 
dimensions. These can include economic fluctuations, disease, environmental hazards, 
conflicts and job losses. Risks are the combination of the probability of shocks occurring and 
the extent of their consequences.  Often, such shocks cannot be prevented and can have 
devastating impacts on communities, households and individuals if they materialise (USAID 
2007:6). Hence, risk makes up a cross-cutting issue that transcends all aspects of the food 
security framework. It is an important factor, as it is intrinsically connected to household 
vulnerability and resilience to outside shocks. It helps us gain a holistic understanding of the 
food security challenges faced at the household level. Figure 3 visualises the relationship 
between the four dimensions of food security. 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Vulnerability to Food Insecurity 
Vulnerability refers to the exposure and sensitivity of households to livelihood shocks and is 
closely linked to the notion of risk. It refers to the wide range of factors that can place people 
at risk of having their livelihoods disrupted and becoming food insecure16. The level of 
vulnerability is determined by the nature of the risks faced as well as by the resilience of 
households, meaning their capability to anticipate risks, limit their impacts and regain an 
acceptable level of functioning after exposure to shocks (ibid.; FAO 2003:9). 
Since Sen first published his ground-breaking work on entitlements and famine in 1981, 
emphasis in food security research has increasingly been focused on vulnerability, livelihood 
assets, and coping strategies. Sen argued that the ability of a household to cope depended on 
its capability to access and leverage resources in times of need. His work made up a framework 
for the definition and assessment of vulnerability which has been expanded and refined ever 
since. One scholar, Caroline Moser, has contributed the “Asset Vulnerability Framework” 
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 While vulnerability refers to a range of livelihood disruptions, food insecurity often happens as a first 
consequence of exposure to shocks. In this thesis, vulnerability is understood primarily in terms of food 
insecurity. 
Availability Access Utilisation FOOD SECURITY 
Risk 
Figure 3: Dimensions of food security and the relationship between them (author’s construct) 
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(1998) to the literature as a way of measuring vulnerability through asset access at the 
household level. There are five principle categories of livelihood assets, covering human, 
social, natural, physical and economic capital. The categories are interconnected and it is only 
through their combination that freedom from vulnerability can be achieved. The more assets 
people have, the less vulnerable they are, and the greater the loss of people’s assets, the 
greater their vulnerability (Moser 1998:3). Thus, the framework considers the quantity of 
assets in a household and looks at the diversity and value of those assets in order to determine 
the level of vulnerability. 
In order to be resilient and free from vulnerability, households must have access to a 
combination of assets. Income alone will not suffice since not all assets of importance to 
sustaining a livelihood and maintaining food security are economic. Research shows that poor 
people themselves define poverty not only in terms of income, but also in terms of deprivation 
and insecurity. Hence, feeling lonely or powerless, or having a physical weakness are also 
dimensions of poverty (Rakodi & Lloyd-Jones 2002:5). On the other hand, those who are 
deprived economically might have access to other assets which can be transformed into a 
higher degree of security, such as good health, relationships, a strong network, education or 
other skills (ibid:10). Analyses of vulnerability should therefore also, in addition to identifying 
threats, include the identification of household resilience, or responsiveness, in utilising 
opportunities and resisting the negative effects of shocks. The means of such resistance are 
the assets that a household can mobilise and manage when facing hardship (Moser 1998:3). 
Thus, the ability to limit household vulnerability does not only depend on available assets, it 
depends on the capacity to leverage those assets into items such as food, income and basic 
necessities. In the context of TPDS in Odisha, where wages are low, jobs difficult to get and 
food scarce, two analytical distinctions related to such livelihood strategies are relevant for the 
analysis. First is the distinction between income-raising strategies, which are aimed at 
accessing food and reducing overall livelihood risks, and consumption-modifying strategies, by 
which people seek to make the most of what they have got (Devereux 2001:511-512). Second, 
and following from this, is the distinction between adapting, which is a permanent change in 
the ways of acquiring food, and coping, meaning a response to an immediate and sudden 
decline in access to food (Davies in Moser 1998:5). Both distinctions will be employed to 
illustrate the level of vulnerability among households in the study context. 
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Figure 4 illustrates vulnerability and resilience as different ends of a continuum with assets, 
strategies and levels of adapting and coping as influencing factors. The continuum illustrates a 
dynamic relationship where the position of the factors will vary according to the risk context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Development and the State 
Turning to the debate on the state in development, converging opinions exist on how to best 
trigger local development and what the role of the state should be in this process. Some assert 
that emphasis should be on the internal structure of the state and the character of state-
society relations; others believe that the main potential lies with society alone. The following 
section outlines the debate. 
4.2.1 From rolling back the State to bringing the State back in 
In the 1980s, the dominant paradigm in economics claimed that state intervention was 
strangling the economy and hindering the development of productive forces. It was based on 
the idea that the state should be “rolled back” through decentralisation and privatisation in 
order for economic growth and development to thrive. This was particularly pronounced in 
what John Williamson termed the Washington Consensus, which referred to the economic 
policies promoted for developing countries by Washington-based institutions such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It stipulated a minimalist state approach for 
developing countries under the prescription to stabilise, privatise and liberalise (Williamson 
1990). There was no role for the state in development and trust was put in the regulatory 
mechanisms of the market. 
Some scholars, though, resisted this discourse and argued in favour of what Theda Skocpol 
(1985) first referred to as “bringing the state back in”. Among them was Peter Evans, who 
went as far as to argue that the state is in fact a key variable in reaching developmental ends 
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(Evans 1997). Evans went against the neoliberal views of the time by asserting that 
development is best achieved through collaboration between the state and society – an idea 
he coined state-society synergy. With it he claimed that the potential for developmental 
success as well as the barriers against it rest within the state (ibid.). 
In academia, the debate has since evolved. Disagreement remains as to whether there is a 
need to strengthen the state or whether emphasis should be on decentralisation and reliance 
on non-state mechanisms. Today, these mechanisms refer to community-based organisations 
and social funds, rather than to markets, and state proponents caution against such 
alternatives removing the responsibility of the state in delivering basic services (Srivastava 
2010:4). Yet, the focus on civil society and locally grounded, bottom-up approaches has gained 
momentum in the field of development and COs play a central role in the delivery of services 
today. The state is commonly viewed as “…flabby, bureaucratic and corrupt” and as a key 
obstacle to development, whereas the value of civil society is highlighted and the main 
problem is seen as “… how to induce the state to get out of the way” (Ferguson 2007:387). This 
thesis seeks to go beyond this now dominant discourse by revisiting Evans and considering 
what the contribution of states can be in development intervention and whether centralised 
policies have the potential to facilitate locally grounded development. The following section 
outlines the main elements of Evans’ thinking. 
4.2.2 State-Society Synergy 
State-society synergy is the notion that the state can act as a strong facilitator for development 
when working together with civil society (Varda 2011:898). It implies that community 
engagement serves to strengthen state institutions, and that solid and competent state 
institutions create an enabling environment for engaging communities. Through state-society 
synergy, strong governments and active communities can thus enhance each other’s 
developmental efforts (Evans 1996:1034). The synergy fosters mutually supportive relations 
across sectors and can be a catalyst for development. 
When defining state-society synergy, Evans distinguishes between complementarity and 
embeddedness. The first refers to the mutually supportive relations between the state and 
society, where governments deliver certain collective goods, complementing inputs that are 
more efficiently delivered by private or community actors. This results in greater overall 
outputs than would have been achieved by either sector on its own (Evans 1997:179-80). 
Public institutions are not directly linked to community members and the contribution of the 
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state is rather general and distanced. Hence, “Effective states deliver rule-governed 
environments which strengthen and increase the efficiency of local organizations and 
institutions” (ibid.). Embeddedness, on the other hand, refers to the relations that connect 
government officials with community members across the public-private divide. It is when the 
state and local communities become interlinked, and when knowledge and objectives are 
shared. It is when networks of collaboration and trust are created, binding the state and 
society together. Synergy based on embeddedness thus transcends the boundaries between 
the public and the private spheres, and, according to Evans, this is pivotal to developmental 
success (ibid:183-85). Complementarity and embeddedness are mutually supportive and the 
most solid cases of synergy involve a combination of the two (ibid:189). 
Evans views the state as key to developmental success and suggests that the limits to synergy 
lie within governments rather than society. Barriers include the inflexible nature of 
government institutions, bureaucracy and conflicting political interests (ibid:196-97). In order 
for state-society synergy to take place, a set of competent and engaged institutions must 
therefore be in place:  
“Robust, sophisticated public institutions are an advantage both in the formation of local 
social capital and in the pursuit of developmental ends, not because they are instruments of 
centralisation but because they are capable of formulating more nuanced ways of distributing 
power and therefore of supporting decentralisation and openness to self-organisation” 
(ibid:195). 
The quote illustrates that there is a need for an effective state which, at the same time, is open 
to inputs from society. In this way, the two otherwise contrasting approaches of top-down and 
bottom-up are reconciled, and from their combination emerges the prospects of greater 
overall achievements. This view is reflected in the 1997 World Development Report where the 
state is seen as central to development, not as a direct provider of growth but as a facilitator, 
partner and catalyst. Focus is on the effectiveness of development in meeting local needs, 
coupled with efforts to involve civil society and the private sector in the delivery of collective 
goods (WB 1997). The influence of Evans and the importance of complementarity and 
embeddedness are reflected in the report’s objective of “…bringing government closer to the 
people through broader participation and decentralization” (ibid:3). 
Despite these developments, most literature has denied a positive role for the state (Varda 
2011:899), which is often seen as the culprit, leaving communities worse off through its 
intervention (Evans 1996:1034). Evans does not deny the potentially negative aspects of state 
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intervention and acknowledges that it can both destroy social networks and undermine 
valuable social norms. Instead, he challenges the idea that such issues necessarily constitute 
the norm and suggests that a large potential to achieve positive results lies within states as 
well (Evans 1996:1034). Other scholars (including Huntoon 2001; Tendler 1997; Warner 2001; 
Varda 2011) support this argument and it is upon this line of thought the second part of the 
analysis will be built. 
5. Analysis Part I: The Function of TPDS 
5.1 Dimensions of Food Security in Rayagada and Khordha Districts 
In the following, empirical data from Odisha is analysed to answer the first research question 
of the thesis, examining the function played by TPDS in the lives of beneficiaries in terms of 
food security and vulnerability. 
5.1.1 Food Availability and Access 
In both Rayagada and Khordha districts, food is available. In terms of natural resources, Odisha 
is by no means a deprived state, and food availability can easily be characterised as 
“comfortable” (CES 2011:5). Market stalls abound with vegetables, rice, dal, fish, mutton and 
poultry and for those who have money to spend, food is plentiful and varied. However, 
restrictions of an economic, physical and social nature limit the ability of the poorest to access 
the food. A main obstacle is the lack of purchasing power to buy food in the market place, as 
the majority of the poor find work as daily labourers, living from day to day on earnings 
ranging from as little as 50 to 200 Rs. a day17. With job availability being low, daily labourers 
also constantly face the challenge of finding work and many only work between 10 and 15 
days every month. Further, as many households only have one income earner, typically the 
male household head, income levels are generally low and money is stretched to feed 
everyone. Hence, work availability impacts heavily on food access, and in times when work is 
scarce, some households do not have sufficient food to meet their needs. This is the reality for 
many of the households who participated in the study. Rice18 from TPDS therefore makes up a 
vital supply of food, which is easily accessible, affordable and reliable. From day to day it 
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 50 Rs. equals approximately 0.9 USD (XE 2013) 
18
 Although rice is not the only TPDS commodity, it constitutes the bulk of the food distributed to BPL 
households. Wheat is only distributed to APL households and sugar is seen as a supplementary food 
item.  
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provides people with a minimum of food and creates a sense of security in knowing that there 
will always be something to eat: 
“Yes, we have ups and downs in our life, but in that situation this contribution from PDS
19
 is a 
lot and we are facing challenges positively. Because we feel that we won’t have nothing to 
eat. We have something to eat. At least rice” (Sabita, 62). 
Some respondents explained that they would rely on TPDS for the days of the month when 
work would not be available: “Between 10 and 12 days I am getting the work. After that, the 
rest of the days we are depending on PDS rice” (Vaikunth, 50). The statement tells about the 
economic habits of the household and indicates that money is spent from day to day. As 
money is scarce, it is spent immediately and no planning or savings take place. 50 year-old 
Gotum faced a similar situation: “As I am getting daily [wages], I am spending the whole 
amount. There is no balance for the future”. He went on to explain that, although he, contrary 
to many other BPL households, had a bank account, he had no money to put into it. This 
emerged as a common pattern among the respondents. 
In regards to physical restrictions to food access, most respondents did not have access to 
land. Some were sharecroppers, renting land in return for a share of the crops produced, and 
would produce food to supplement what was bought at the market or through TPDS. 
However, the majority of respondents did not have land and did not produce food for their 
own consumption. This made them vulnerable to price fluctuations and food availability in the 
market, making the contribution from TPDS crucial to daily livelihoods. 
For those who are old, alone or sick, there can also be social obstacles in accessing food, 
especially if economic and physical restrictions are also present. A significant share of the 
respondents was thus socially deprived; many were ill or physically disabled. However, 
common for all was that they received support from their families or social networks. Elders 
relied on their children and grandchildren for food, people who were ill were generally 
supported by their immediate families, and those who were alone relied on neighbours for 
help. For households with members who are deprived in this way, TPDS constitutes a 
significant contribution and helps feed the mouths of those who are themselves not able to 
contribute in obtaining or producing food. 
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 In daily interaction, TPDS is still commonly referred to as PDS. 
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5.1.2 Food Utilisation 
Turning to the way food is utilised, the findings show that available food is utilised with the 
view to extract the maximum amount of energy and nutrition from it. The following quote 
illustrates a strategy that emerged across many interviews: “We are taking vegetables, curry – 
different types. Our food habit is very good because we are taking low quantity, but quality 
food” (Nabha, 60). Most people explained that they would eat two meals a day, lunch and 
dinner, as well as a light breakfast of biscuits and tea, or rice water. Lunch and dinner would 
make up the main meals and would usually consist of rice and curry, or dal. Some families 
would eat non-veg once a week such as eggs, dried fish or chicken. Others would be so poor 
that the rice from TPDS made up their only source of food, and they would only rarely eat 
vegetables. Hence, different households sought to maintain their energy and nutrient intake 
by managing the food available to them. Nabha was aware of the need to stretch the food, 
while acknowledging the importance of a varied diet. Her household would therefore eat three 
meals a day, and although the meals would be small in size they would be of nutritional value. 
When asked what would happen if subsidised entitlements from TPDS were no longer 
available, all respondents conveyed deep concerns about the nutritional impact it would have 
on their livelihoods. A common response was that they would have to eat less every day, and 
that food would not be sufficient to keep everyone alive. People would have to labour harder, 
which is difficult when work is already scarce and when one is hungry. One respondent said 
that they would become beggars in the streets, another that they would have to revert to 
eating roots from the forest. As Aakash, a 40-year-old sharecropper, put it: “I am not only 
partially, but 80% dependent on the PDS. So if it is stopped, it would send a cyclone into 
society”. Similarly, Shivani, an elderly woman in Rayagada explained: “Starvation deaths would 
occur in the village /…/. How many days can [people] tolerate without food? If taking the food, 
the lady can breastfeed the baby. Without food, how can she feed the child?”. These quotes 
illustrate a strong dependence on the commodities received through TPDS and they show that 
significant value is ascribed to the system. Some people found it difficult to explain what would 
happen to them if TPDS was discontinued, but used words such as hurting, horrible, distress, 
disaster, hazardous, difficult, suffering and scarcity, all indicating the important function played 
by TPDS for them to face and manage risks in their daily lives. As TPDS has been implemented 
for decades, it has become an ingrained part of life, constituting a reliable and nutritious 
source of food. This finding supports the very limited research conducted on the topic to date, 
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which has established TPDS as an important source of food security for beneficiary households 
(Khera 2011). 
5.1.3 Risk 
In terms of the risks faced by beneficiary households, most have already been touched upon 
above, which highlights the interlinkages between the different dimensions of food security. 
An array of potential hazards, including the risks of job scarcity, agricultural shocks, rising 
market prices and health problems, all impact on household food security in terms of 
availability, access, or utilisation. One example illustrates how the dimensions can impact each 
other and how sudden shocks can affect food security: at the time fieldwork was conducted, 
Cyclone Nilam hit the South-Eastern coast of India and brought torrential rains, flash floods 
and agricultural devastation, affecting the lives and livelihoods of tens of thousands. Crops 
were destroyed across Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Odisha, which not only impacted 
individual farmers but also affected the overall food availability in India, with the expected 
agricultural output for 2012/2013 now estimated 20% below the previous five-year average 
(FAO 2013:20). The situation is likely to lead to an increase in food prices, further complicating 
access to food for the poorest, which in turn can influence nutritional intake and food 
utilisation. The cyclone has left many beneficiary households more vulnerable and exposed to 
risk. To them TPDS provides a crucial safety net. 
It is evident that beneficiary households are exposed to a range of risks that can potentially 
threaten their livelihoods. The most commonly occurring shocks identified in the study are 
related to job scarcity and health problems. As the majority of respondents rely on wages from 
daily labour, and as job availability is low, all face income scarcity and the uncertainty of when 
work will be available. As we have seen, this impacts household food security and can also 
increase vulnerability to other risks, such as disease. Health issues emerged as a common issue 
as many respondents were themselves ill or had family members who were. This heavily 
impacted on the existing asset portfolios of households, as income had to be diverted to 
medical bills, while fewer hands could contribute their labour to the household. As noted by 
Ananya, a 48-year old woman: “… because I am ill, my children won’t let me work. The doctors 
can’t tell my condition, but we have spent 40.000 [Rs.] on medical bills so far. So I completely 
depend on my children”. 
Other shocks and stresses encountered through the study included crop failure and irrigation 
problems for those who depended on agriculture, heavy debts, and alcoholism, which was 
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described as a source of conflict within households, leading to diversion of money for alcohol 
while leaving people idle and unproductive. Hence, beneficiaries of TPDS face many risks and 
are confronted with a range of shocks in their daily lives. 
5.2 Vulnerability among Beneficiary Households 
As the exposure to risks is high, it is necessary to consider the level of resilience within 
households to determine how vulnerable they are and how well they will cope if shocks occur. 
We therefore now turn to consider the nature of beneficiary households’ asset portfolios as 
well as their ability to leverage these assets into basic livelihood necessities. 
Common among respondents was the lack of economic capital, with low and irregular wages 
and limited access to credit. Some received disability and old-age pensions of 300 Rs. a month, 
but the contribution of such benefits to the livelihood of households was negligible. Others 
took small loans from their neighbours in times of need, thereby drawing on their social capital 
and the relationships with people around them. Across the respondent base, social capital 
emerged as an important asset, drawn on by many and founded on cultural values of helping 
others in need. As explained by Shivani: “The neighbours they have no food. I can give some 
one day, two days, three days /…/ this is just to the point, everybody of the village is my 
relatives. Not that I am blood relation. Society relation!” Shivani, who is an old blind woman 
living by herself, relies on her sons for food and has enough to help her neighbours too. For 
her, it is given that she must share her food. Social capital and the custom of helping others 
and sharing one’s resources is a strong asset which is found throughout the study. Being part 
of a community, or a family, and relying on social relationships creates a security for people 
who are experiencing stress in their lives. 
In terms of human capital, on the other hand, many households are severely deprived. As we 
have seen, health problems are faced by many and leave households vulnerable to other 
shocks. Further, close to half of the respondents are illiterate and have no education. This 
impacts on their opportunities of getting work, as noted by 30-year old Maneesh: “For 
illiterate [people] there is no job”. Those unable to read or write have no other options but to 
work as daily labourers in jobs that are often physically hard and poorly paid. In terms of 
physical capital, most respondents live in simple shacks, almost half lack access to proper 
sanitation and approximately one third do not have electricity in their homes. Similarly, 
although most people do have access to water, they lack natural capital, since most do not 
have access to the land, soil or minerals needed to grow food and sustain their livelihoods. 
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Summing up, beneficiary households are generally deprived both in terms of the quantity and 
the diversity of their assets. Only social capital is generally shared among households and 
constitutes the single most important means in resisting challenges and sustaining livelihoods. 
As such, it is the one asset that can help people in coping with shocks as well as adapting to the 
circumstances they face in their daily lives. Money is scarce, health and education levels are 
low, infrastructure is lacking and access to land is limited, yet, social relationships and family 
ties are strong, and this is what helps people move on and resist the hardships in their lives. 
5.2.1 Income-raising and consumption-modifying Strategies 
TPDS plays an important role in strengthening asset portfolios and in helping people leverage 
their assets into livelihood necessities. The commodities received through TPDS are employed 
to reduce overall livelihood risks and increase income and food intake through income-raising 
strategies. Hence, most respondents explained that the money released through TPDS was 
spent on additional food in the market and helped them obtain a more varied diet. Others 
found it helpful in paying for necessities such as medicine and rent. Many also spent money on 
their children’s education and showed great awareness of the importance of having an 
education. Prioritising education for one’s children or for oneself, in the case of younger 
people, was generally seen as a way of working towards a different and better future. This 
awareness was encountered throughout the interviews and is illustrated in the case of Deepak, 
a 21-year-old man who was living away from his family, working 10 hours every day as a waiter 
and still found the time to go to school for four hours every morning. He knew that without an 
education, he would not be able to get a good job and rise from his current position of 
poverty. 
Other income-raising strategies included small-scale agriculture to supplement incomes, 
collection of firewood or providing services such as grinding wheat for others at one’s home. 
Generally, people found ways to use their skills and make the most of their assets and in doing 
so, TPDS made a significant contribution by releasing money for other household necessities 
and providing a safety net for people to rely on. Knowing that they would have a minimum of 
food enabled people to focus on other risks and increase their resilience to shocks. In this way, 
TPDS helped households in adapting to scarcity. 
When shocks occur, TPDS is also used to stretch the available food through consumption-
modifying strategies. One such strategy involves cutting back on total household spending and 
only purchasing essential goods. Many also reported that in times of need they would change 
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their dietary habits by cutting down on the number of meals and solely relying on rice from 
TPDS: “In our distressed situation this PDS rice is helpful. /…/ if an accident happens to us, we 
have rice to eat. With salt, with the chilli. So it is really good for us.” (Devaki, 35). Across the 
two districts, people explained that in times of scarcity they would mainly rely on TPDS rice, 
eaten with water, onions, chilli or salt. TPDS commodities thus become the main food source 
and provide people with a means for coping with shocks. 
Both when employing income-raising and consumption-modifying strategies, when 
permanently adapting to one’s environment and when coping with sudden shocks, TPDS 
serves an important function for beneficiary households. It provides people with greater 
capacity to leverage their assets into livelihood necessities while at the same time increasing 
their level of resilience. As a result, TPDS has, in itself, become a main livelihood strategy and is 
of such importance that even the thought of it being discontinued is incomprehensible to 
many, as described in 5.1.2. 
5.3 Local Perceptions of TPDS 
We have now established that TPDS brings a certain level of food security and resilience to 
beneficiary households by increasing availability and access to food while providing for better 
food utilisation and ensuring against risks. Let us now go further and uncover other aspects of 
TPDS in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the programme. This is done by 
exploring local perceptions – first among beneficiaries and then government officials. 
5.3.1 The View of Beneficiaries 
Without exception, when asked about their perceptions of TPDS, all respondents praised the 
programme and said that they were satisfied with it. They expressed gratitude towards the 
Government and emphasised the importance of TPDS in their lives. However, in response to 
other questions, it became clear that they also experienced problems and had some 
complaints. 
Three main criticisms emerged, including that (1) some poor households are entirely left out 
from TPDS; (2) several households depend on one single entitlement; and (3) large households 
receive the same quantities as smaller ones, making the benefits smaller for households with 
many members. It is thus evident that not everyone is benefitting from TPDS and that 
targeting errors and the reliance on outdated data are negatively impacting households across 
the two districts. More than one third of respondents reported that they knew of excluded 
households in their local communities, and on a number of occasions they urged the 
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Government to solve this problem. This was most pronounced in a private interview with a 
young woman who exclaimed: “Why [do] rich people have the [BPL] card when poor families, 
big families don’t? /…/ The Government is not working!” (Ipsita, 20). She expressed a common 
opinion – that exclusion and inclusion errors in TPDS need to be addressed – but added the 
criticism of the Government. In no other interviews were any criticisms voiced against the 
Government and the privacy of this interview and the fact that no translator was needed 
makes this an important finding, indicating that possibly, respondents are more critical of the 
Government than they admit in the presence of government officials. The issues of exclusion 
and inclusion errors mentioned by Ipsita are linked to the problem of several households 
depending on a single entitlement, as both are due to the lack of continual reassessments of 
household eligibility. Sabita explained the impact of the situation on her household: 
“… families have grown and families are large but card is one. /…/ I have three sons 
depending on the [BPL card] and every month I am getting 25 kg of rice, segregated 
by my sons. First one, then second, then third” (Sabita, 62). 
The similar problem of small and large households receiving the same quantities was also 
pronounced throughout both districts and was described as a cause of inequality. 
Turning to the proposal of replacing TPDS with DCTs, the study found very strong and 
consistent opposition among respondents and thereby supports the findings of the limited 
research conducted on the topic thus far (Khera 2011; Puri 2012). In focus groups, the topic 
would lead to people raising their voices and it was clear that this was something they felt 
strongly about. Two concerns were repeated across the study: that cash would be diverted to 
other items than food, and that DCTs could disturb gender structures and lead to household 
conflicts. The general view was that money would be administered by male household heads 
and spent on alcohol and tobacco, or on other items such as medicine or clothes. All were of 
the opinion that money would be managed poorly and spent on non-food items. One woman 
expressed these concerns and the importance ascribed to reliable food access when she 
exclaimed: “If rice will be converted into cash, will man eat cash?” (Pallavi, 34). This rhetorical 
question underlined what emerged to be the general opinion among respondents, namely that 
a minimum level of food security would continue to be secured through TPDS, while it might 
be jeopardised through the introduction of DCTs. Shivani elaborated on this point: 
“If the money is supplied … that money will be misutilised by the household person. /…/ The 
male leading member will use that money [for] liquor /…/ He will come with the empty 
stomach. He will beat the mother: Feed me, feed me! Wherefrom she can give the help to 
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him? He spent the money on drinking. She has no rice, he will beat her, but wherefrom she 
will get the rice to feed him?” (Shivani, 80). 
The quote illustrates how money and food are gendered issues and that the introduction of 
DCTs could have a negative effect on family structures and even increase domestic violence. As 
food is typically a private, female matter, women can go to the distribution points and collect 
their entitlements through TPDS. They can ensure that their families have a minimum of food 
to eat and thereby fulfil their responsibilities within the household. Money, on the other hand, 
is typically handled by men, and in the event that DCTs should be introduced women would no 
longer be able to administer the process of obtaining food, as noted in a focus group with both 
men and women present: “…women will not be able to [go to] the panchayat to collect money” 
(FGD_5). Money would instead be in the hands of male household heads and would likely be 
spent on non-food items, particularly on alcohol, which was mentioned repeatedly, including 
by one man in Khordha who rhetorically asked: “Does the Government want to give money for 
alcohol?” (Jahnu, 45). This view was supported by male and female respondents in both 
districts and all were of the opinion that ultimately, DCTs would increase vulnerability among 
households and leave them more food insecure, as DCTs would not in the same way as TPDS 
carry the promise of food and stability every month. 
Price fluctuations in the market place were also an argument against DCTs and respondents 
expressed concerns that relying on DCTs would increase their vulnerability to rising food 
prices. The convenience of TPDS with distribution points commonly located in villages close to 
people’s homes and the reliability and security associated with TPDS vis-à-vis DCTs was also 
heavily emphasised. 
It should be noted, however, that beneficiaries generally expressed great awareness of the 
value of money. There was a consistent emphasis on money and it was generally agreed that 
money is needed in order to lead a good life. Requests for grants and scholarships, which 
emerged from the interviews, testify to this fact. The heavy opposition against replacing TPDS 
with DCTs should be seen against this backdrop and illustrates the respective importance 
ascribed to TPDS. 
The findings are consistent with the view of Sen who, despite usually arguing in favour of 
increased freedom for individuals, cautions against the replacement of food subsidies with 
DCTs. He argues that such a change is likely to lead to a decrease in nutritional intake and 
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carries the risk of payment delays, which could lead to extreme hardship for the poorest (The 
Hindu 2013). 
5.3.2 The View of Government Officials 
Turning to the views of government officials, opinions on TPDS varied between those ranking 
highest and those having direct contact with beneficiaries. Supplies inspectors and project 
implementers argued that the contribution from TPDS makes a large difference for 
beneficiaries, based on arguments similar to those given by the beneficiaries themselves. They 
expressed the opinion that TPDS is a good system with many positive aspects but with need for 
certain improvements. They agreed on the urgent need to update the database from 1997 in 
order to eliminate targeting errors and make the system more inclusive of the genuinely poor, 
while effectively excluding those less vulnerable. In this respect, the views of government field 
staff reflected the reality among beneficiaries. 
Meanwhile, their superiors highlighted the problems of the programme and argued in favour 
of its replacement by DCTs. A main argument was that TPDS did not give incentives for people 
to work: 
“PDS is not helpful for the Indian people. /…/ it has been on-going for too many years. People 
have come to expect the food and it creates no incentives for them to work. In this way, 
manpower is wasted. They do not plan for the future, and this is encouraged by PDS, as they 
know that there will always be more food in a few weeks’ time”. 
Thus, higher-ranking government officials were concerned with the dependency created 
through TPDS and worried that it did not encourage beneficiaries to take responsibility for 
their own lives or plan for the future. The problem was elaborated by a supplies inspector who 
estimated that 70% of beneficiary households heavily relied on TPDS while the rest merely saw 
it as an opportunity to work less. This is a reflection of inclusion error and might be mitigated if 
eligibility for TPDS was reassessed, thereby excluding those not needing the subsidies. 
Dependency, on the other hand, is certainly a problem of TPDS. However, one can argue that 
the fundamental need of food must first be addressed before other development issues can be 
achieved (WFP 2013). 
In terms of DCTs, the views of beneficiaries were to a large extent reflected by supplies 
inspectors and project implementers, who, through their close interaction with beneficiaries, 
had a thorough understanding of local realities. As noted by one such official: “The money 
would not be spent wisely. Food reaches the poor people’s bellies and helps the children too. 
Money would not do that”. Conversely, those higher up in the hierarchy and further removed 
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from beneficiaries were of the opinion that TPDS should be phased out and replaced by DCTs. 
They saw TPDS as a complicated and expensive operation, creating dependency among 
beneficiaries while not triggering any form of economic development. They saw the value of 
DCTs in economic terms but did not consider the nutritional impact such a change could have 
for beneficiaries. 
5.4 Summing Up: The Function of TPDS 
Summing up, findings show that TPDS is fulfilling an important function across Rayagada and 
Khordha districts by bringing a certain level of food security to beneficiary households. It 
increases availability and access to food, enhances food utilisation and ensures against risk. It 
increases resilience against outside shocks and establishes a feeling of security by 
strengthening the asset portfolios of beneficiary households. Due to TPDS, people know that 
they will always have the minimum of food they need to survive, while money is released for a 
more varied diet, children’s education and other necessities, such as medicine or rent. It 
constitutes a safety net on which people can rely, both when times are good and when sudden 
shocks occur, disrupting money and food flows. TPDS has thus, in itself, become a main 
livelihood strategy: people manage their TPDS commodities in order to reduce overall risks and 
increase incomes and food intake, while in times of need they might solely rely on rice from 
TPDS. We thus see how both income-raising and consumption-modifying strategies are 
employed; people are both adapting and coping, based on TPDS commodities. However, 
significant issues remain as many households feel the consequences of government targeting 
errors: despite being poor, many households are excluded entirely from the system, and in 
other cases several households rely on one single entitlement. Not everyone benefits from 
TPDS and those who are excluded become even more vulnerable as they are disadvantaged in 
relation to other poor households. 
In terms of the proposal to replace TPDS with DCTs, the study found strong and consistent 
opposition among beneficiaries and government field staff, while higher-ranking officials were 
more supportive of the idea. Concerns were primarily based on the belief that cash would be 
diverted to non-food commodities, leaving households more food insecure, and that the 
change to DCTs would disturb gender structures and ultimately increase household 
vulnerability. Hence, by hypothetically challenging the status quo that TPDS constitutes, the 
study revealed other layers of importance of TPDS. 
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In sum, the study found that TPDS is meeting local food security needs and fulfilling an 
important function in the study context. Let us now take the discussion further and on the 
basis of these findings consider the appropriate role for states in development. 
6. Analysis Part II: The Role of the State in Development 
The discussion of TPDS provides an interesting case for the discussion of the role for states in 
development. By illustrating that this huge government-led programme is markedly successful 
in meeting local needs, the case – to some extent – supports Evans’ argument for state 
involvement. In the following, the case will be further discussed in terms of the potential for 
state-society synergy and it is considered how increased community involvement could serve 
to strengthen and improve the current implementation. 
6.1 Complementarity and Embeddedness in TPDS 
TPDS is a classic example of a centralised programme, implemented through a top-down 
approach. It is large-scale, government-driven and based on decisions made far from the 
communities in which it is implemented. Meanwhile frequent instances of corruption, grain 
diversion and targeting errors paint a picture of TPDS as inefficient and removed from the 
reality of its beneficiaries. And yet, as we have seen, TPDS is in fact contributing to increased 
food security and creates a certain level of resilience at the household level. TPDS is certainly 
not a concrete example of state-society synergy, but it does contain certain elements of 
complementarity and embeddedness which might be contributing to these encouraging 
outcomes. It is to these that we now turn. 
In terms of complementarity, through TPDS, the state provides a service that would not 
otherwise be available to poor communities. It facilitates access to food, which becomes a 
collective good in the relationship between the state and society. On the other hand, 
community members possess the capacity to leverage the goods received through TPDS into 
other livelihood assets, whereby resilience is created and communities are strengthened. The 
programme is based on a clear division between the public and the societal spheres and relies 
on mutually supporting relations between them. This was clearly observed in the study 
through the strong segregation between implementing government bodies and beneficiaries 
of TPDS. High-ranking government officials only occasionally visited distribution points, and 
when they did, interaction would be with FPS owners – not directly with beneficiaries. Thus, 
FPS owners become the link between local communities and the Government and it is through 
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them that feedback is provided. FPS owners are locally appointed by their communities and 
although the financial benefits are limited, the position is a respectable one based on the trust 
of the people. This is illustrated in the following quote: 
“… the villagers selected me for the distribution of PDS because people have faith in me. They 
know that because of this person we will get our commodities in the right quantity, right time 
and right manner.” (FPS_4) 
Another FPS owner explained: “We are the only channels; we are taking the commodities… and 
delivering to the people” (FPS_1). Thus, FPS owners constitute the link between the state and 
society and they view themselves as representatives of their communities. Here, Evans’ notion 
of embeddedness becomes relevant, as FPS owners through engagement in networks of 
collaboration and trust with state as well as community actors transcend the divide between 
the two spheres. Through interviews with FPS owners it was evident that they had a deep 
understanding of local realities and perceived themselves as part of the communities they 
were serving. Their statements reflected those of beneficiaries well and their body language 
and tone of voice indicated that the issue was close to their hearts. As put by one FPS owner 
who was also a farmer: “I can make my livelihood through my agriculture. Why I am preferring 
this PDS is because I want to contribute my work, my dedication to the people /…/. It is because 
of the people I am here.” (FPS_4). FPS owners commonly supplement incomes from their 
businesses with agricultural production as the profit margin on TPDS distribution is limited. 
Their lives are not very different from the lives of their beneficiaries and they share many of 
the same hardships. As a result, FPS owners are good ambassadors for their communities and 
are able to convey important feedback to government officials. A parallel can be drawn here to 
the findings of Judith Tendler (1997) who through empirical studies of good government in 
Brazil has illustrated the importance of worker dedication in performance improvement. She 
found that when government workers were committed to their jobs, and particularly when 
they engaged in relationships of trust with the communities they served, the overall outcome 
would be significantly improved. Certainly, such worker dedication and trust was present 
among the FPS owners interviewed in this study and can be seen as one of the strengths of 
TPDS. 
Another aspect of embeddedness lies in the relationships between government supplies 
inspectors and beneficiaries. The job of inspectors is to oversee the entire supply chain in their 
blocks, including visits to procurement sites, inspections at milling points and regular check-
ups at FPSs to ensure that delivery to beneficiaries is timely and correct. Although inspectors 
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primarily interact with FPS owners during such check-ups, they also meet the beneficiaries. It 
happened a number of times during field observations that beneficiaries directly addressed 
the inspectors with their feedback. Some expressed dissatisfaction with a particular FPS owner, 
others explained the problems experienced by households excluded from TPDS, some argued 
against the introduction of DCTs and others again emphasised the need to reassess eligibility 
through a new household survey. The study found that the nature of the relationship between 
inspectors and communities to a large extent depended on the personal attitude of the 
inspectors. While some saw it as a matter of personal pride to do the job “with the heart” and 
showed a great level of commitment as well as an understanding of the hardships endured by 
beneficiaries, others were less engaged with the local communities. Such inspectors appeared 
to only interact with FPS owners and other officials and when asked to define their job, they 
highlighted the importance of working for the Government. The objective of providing food 
security to beneficiaries was not mentioned. 
The personal attitudes of inspectors towards beneficiaries are likely to be an important and 
defining factor for the way beneficiaries experience the Government. Beneficiaries in blocks 
with engaged inspectors might experience a more supportive state-society relationship and 
have a bigger chance of strengthening their own communities in terms of engagement and 
participation. The chance of beneficiaries voicing their feedback would also be greater under 
such enabling circumstances as they would know that they have a chance of being heard. 
According to Evans, such responsive state-society contact constitutes an important foundation 
for development (Evans 1997:185). 
The elements of complementarity and embeddedness in TPDS can shed light on the 
encouraging results found through the field study and explain how the programme meets local 
needs, increases food security and strengthens resilience at the household level. As FPS 
owners are close to their communities and act as their representatives, they bring the state 
closer to the everyday life of beneficiaries. Visits from supplies inspectors further serve to put 
a face to the Government and, as we have seen, can be a forum for community feedback to 
the Government about TPDS. Such embedded relations between state and community actors 
ensure a smoother delivery of TPDS commodities and creates satisfaction with the 
Government at the community level. Possibly even more important than these embedded 
relations is the simple complementarity of the Government providing basic food items to 
vulnerable people with access to limited livelihood assets. The subsidised rice, wheat, sugar 
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and kerosene constitute main livelihood necessities for beneficiaries that they would not 
otherwise have access to. In return, communities become stronger, more resilient and positive 
towards the Government, which in turn benefits the state. It is a case of synergy on a limited 
scale, an example of what Evans terms a ‘small scale success’, which can be achieved even 
within broader adverse contexts (1997). 
These elements constitute a good foundation for synergy and are already leading to positive 
results. The set-up with distribution points in villages and FPS owners and supplies inspectors 
commonly engaging with beneficiaries is an important first step for crossing the divide 
between the state and society. However, certain barriers limit the developmental potential of 
this otherwise promising set-up. These will be discussed in the following. 
6.2 Barriers to Synergy 
Despite clear elements of complementarity and embeddedness in the state-society relations 
surrounding TPDS, the programme also has significant flaws that prevent it from being 
successful. A main issue is corruption. The fact that money and grain is diverted at large scale 
reflects the inefficiency and lack of transparency of the implementing institutions. It is an 
indication that the state institutions are not as solid and engaged as those proposed by Evans. 
Through conversations with various government officials it became clear that corruption is an 
almost natural part of daily life. One official explained that corruption “trickles down” and that 
– in TPDS – it happens at all levels, from the Civil Supplies Office to the supplies inspectors and 
FPS owners. All manoeuvre around the rules and ensure extra benefits for themselves. He 
explained:  
“You can say that there is a need for corruption in India. Everybody in power relies on it and 
are themselves not interested in creating a more transparent system, or empowering the 
poor, if it means that more questions will be asked.” 
This takes us to another issue inherent in TPDS – namely that of conflicting interests between 
those in power and the beneficiaries. Evans talks of the need for shared objectives across the 
state-society divide, but in the study context objectives appeared only to be shared among 
beneficiaries and FPS owners and some supplies inspectors. It appears that politicians and 
high-ranking government officials consider their own interests and are above all interested in 
holding on to their power. Greater levels of transparency would expose corruption and 
restrain such state actors from continuing their endeavours. As noted by the same official: “If 
you see a spark, you will try to prevent a fire from arising. But the Government is not interested 
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in stopping the fire”. The analogy refers to hunger and poverty in India and illustrates how the 
interests of state actors can be conflicting to those of society. According to Evans, “… the 
degree to which interests are shared across the public-private divide /…/ plays a central role in 
determining the potential for synergy” (1997:196). As corruption seems to be so ingrained in 
the internal structure of the state, and as it is accompanied by conflicting state-society 
interests, it seems that the potential for state-society synergy in TPDS is limited. 
The non-participatory structure of TPDS and the fact that little attention is paid by policy 
makers to its outcome and impact at the household level constitutes another barrier to 
synergy. The programme is run at a distance from everyday life at the community level and 
beneficiaries and their experiences are in no way included in the design or implementation of 
the programme. The extensive problems of exclusion error and its impact on households in 
every village visited in the study can be ascribed to this top-down structure. There are no 
mechanisms for feedback between beneficiaries and policy makers or regular systems for 
programme improvement. The system is implemented from above and there is an extensive 
gap between the community and policy levels, where the links of FPS owners and supplies 
inspectors become negligible as they are themselves not engaged in programme design. 
Performance evaluations are irregular and focus on delivery mechanisms, consumer take-off 
rates, targeting errors, leakages and diversions (PEO 2005). They build on quantitative surveys 
and do not consider the role or impact of TPDS in ensuring food security among beneficiaries. 
This is another aspect of TPDS that is rather problematic when seen from the view of Evans, as 
it obstructs any opportunity of involving local communities and opening up for local inputs in 
TPDS. Consequently, as long as beneficiaries are not seen as stakeholders and potential 
partners by the state, synergy will not occur. 
Corruption, conflicting interests and non-participation thus constitute three main barriers to 
synergy in TPDS. When considered against the issues of grain diversion, leakages and targeting 
error – commonly discussed as the central problems of TPDS – a connection emerges. While 
corrupt practices among government officials and FPS owners lead to diversion and leakages 
of grain, conflicting interests between state and community actors hinder the problem from 
being solved, as those engaged in corruption have no incentive to stop their undertakings. 
Further, non-participation and the failure of the state in involving beneficiaries in programme 
design has led to continuous issues of targeting error, excluding genuinely poor households 
while including others less vulnerable. Had more responsive state-society mechanisms been in 
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place, the Government’s attention might have been brought to the need for regular 
reassessments of eligibility and the need to update the 1997 survey earlier. 
6.3 Potentials for Synergy 
Let us now turn to a discussion of the potential for overcoming barriers and achieving a higher 
degree of synergy in the implementation of TPDS. As it is clear that the main limitations lie 
within the institutions of the state, it is necessary to consider how these institutions can be 
strengthened and their competencies increased. A natural first step would be to target 
corruption, as it is a main obstacle for the successful delivery of TPDS. This might seem an 
impossible – even naïve – quest for a master’s thesis, and indeed this is not an exhaustive 
account of the complexities of corruption in the Indian public sector. Instead, let it merely be 
acknowledged that corruption is an inherent problem in TPDS that – if left unaddressed – will 
never cease to exist. It is encouraging that the GoI has initiated pilot projects to address 
corrupt practices within TPDS, showing commitment and acknowledgement of the issue at a 
central level. However, ever more bureaucratic measures or changes to the system – including 
digitalisation of the TPDS process, which is tested in Rayagada – are unlikely to prevent those 
in power from maximising their personal benefits. This was supported by responses given by 
government officials – in Rayagada specifically – and one official explained that there would 
always be new ways around such measures. What is proposed here is therefore the need for a 
complete change of outlook and for the state to look to Evans and acknowledge the value of 
inputs from society. By opening up to a greater level of community involvement and 
partnerships with non-state actors, the GoI would have much to gain. The problems of 
corruption, conflicting interests and non-participation would be addressed while local 
knowledge and specialised capacities endowed in COs could be utilised for a common 
developmental goal. COs are not ideal as service providers of food but can contribute 
complementary inputs to the activities of the state. Thereby the overall output could be far 
greater than it is today. 
Such changes would require a complete restructuring of the current organisation of the Indian 
public sector, reaching beyond the institutions of TPDS. This involves, in the words of Sen, 
“making institutions and decisional practices such that they do not encourage – or tolerate – 
corruption” (The Hindu 2013). It would demand a step away from current bureaucracy and 
centralised power structures towards partnerships with civil society and cross-sectoral 
engagement. This would create a more responsive and service-oriented state and might in turn 
41 
 
demand greater levels of transparency and accountability by providing internal checks against 
corruption (Kotwal et al. 2012:117). It is also proposed that incentives are made for individual 
government staff at all levels to seek society involvement and refrain from corruption. Tendler 
(1997) has shown that measures to increase worker dedication, including greater worker 
autonomy and greater trust between workers, managers and local communities lead to 
increases in productivity and performance improvement. In combination with increased 
community involvement, such an emphasis on incentives for individuals might produce 
stronger state institutions and more successful results than is currently the case. 
The current set-up of TPDS with its proximity to beneficiaries and its characteristics of 
complementarity and embeddedness provide an important foundation upon which such a 
change could be built. Hence, TPDS could become a catalyst for locally grounded community 
development reaching further than the provision of subsidised food. It could be 
complemented by schemes for health, job creation20 and education – all designed and 
implemented in cooperation with local COs. There is significant potential for the state in thus 
accepting civil society as a valid partner and embracing Evans’ ideas. Let this therefore be a call 
for the GoI to reassess its current practice and consider if not a complete revamp of its 
institutions might in the long run be of benefit to the state as well as to society. As a minimum, 
the impact of TPDS at the household level should be included in government assessments. This 
would paint a more adequate picture of the programme and help adjust it to the reality on the 
ground. 
Certainly, radical institutional changes are not around the corner and might even seem utopian 
at present as there seems to be little political will to distribute power and resources in India. 
Still, rather than giving in to the seemingly unsolvable issues of corruption, considering 
creative alternatives – such as the one proposed here – might lead to positive results. After all, 
it is widely agreed that civil society has much to contribute, as seen in today’s strong emphasis 
on bottom-up development. The National Advisory Council of India, the advisory body to the 
Prime Minister’s office, proves that such developments are achievable even in the Indian 
context. It has become open and responsive to inputs from social activists and followed 
recommendations of COs, thereby involving community members in the drafting of legislative 
                                                                  
20
 The existing scheme for job creation, the Mahatma Ghandi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act, is government-led – like TPDS – and has been heavily critisised for corruption, poor implementation 
and for ”keeping the poor down” rather than empowering them (Wright & Gupta 2011). 
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policies (Kotwal et al. 2012:110). This is an encouraging development that illustrates that there 
is potential within the Indian state for a larger degree of society involvement. 
7. Concluding Discussion: What the Study of TPDS can bring to the 
Debate on State Intervention 
This thesis has contributed to a comprehensive understanding of TPDS and established that 
TPDS in Rayagada and Khordha districts of Odisha is bringing a certain level of food security 
and resilience to beneficiary households. Despite issues of corruption and targeting errors, this 
large-scale government programme is successful in meeting basic needs at the household 
level. Critics might say that TPDS creates dependency and that it does not lead to 
empowerment of local communities. The findings do not deny this. However, they illustrate a 
more complex reality, where other pressing issues must be solved before local capacities can 
be developed. The most basic needs, in this case related to food, must be met before the 
beneficiaries can pursue higher-order needs like the security of employment, health and 
education (Maslow 1943; WFP 2013). Although critical of the issues of corruption and 
inefficiency, the thesis thus supports the overall implementation of TPDS and recognises it as 
an important foundation for other development projects. Following from this, the thesis is 
critical towards the proposal to replace food subsidies with DCTs as this is found to jeopardise 
the food security offered by TPDS. 
The findings of the study cannot be generalised to the rest of Odisha, even less to the rest of 
India, but they might be an indication of the potentials that lie within TPDS. More research of a 
similar nature is therefore needed to inform policy makers of the reality and impact of TPDS on 
the ground across India before it is dismantled and DCTs introduced. 
Contrary to the general push for bottom-up development, the thesis aligns with the literature 
that supports a central role for the state in development (including Evans 1997; Tendler 1997; 
Varda 2011). Although TPDS is not a concrete example of state-society synergy, the findings 
support Evans’ thinking by illustrating the developmental potential that lies within the Indian 
state. Overall, the study serves to demonstrate the key position of the state in reaching 
developmental ends. It does not deny a positive role for society but supports a reconciliation 
of top-down and bottom-up approaches. It asserts the need for a strong state as well as the 
value of inputs from society and demonstrates that large-scale development programmes can 
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in fact facilitate development that reflects local needs. It is, in short, a case for bringing the 
state back in. 
The argument is not that state intervention is the answer to all challenges in development. On 
the contrary, it is recognised that significant limitations can lie within the state and become a 
hindrance to development. The intention is rather to illustrate that under certain 
circumstances – such as in the case of TPDS – states have an important role to play. They can 
fulfil an important function and bring about positive outcomes at the community level, 
especially if they recognise the value of cross-sectoral partnerships and cooperation with 
society. COs, on the other hand, have scattered and localised impact, but if these ‘pocket 
efforts’ were to be linked to the national policy level and adapted on scale, there would be 
potential for achieving real change. 
More than a decade after Evans first made the case for state-society synergy, the role of the 
state in development continues to be debated. The debate is rather one-sided, however, as 
the bulk of literature and common opinion is in favour of bottom-up development and often 
displays scepticism towards state involvement. In 1997, Evans made a call for more research 
on cases of synergy and this was repeated in 2011 by Danielle Varda, who urged for more 
research to consider the community-level impact of government intervention. Some studies 
have since been produced and this thesis contributes to this moderate body of literature. Let 
this therefore be an encouragement for practitioners and development scholars to re-consider 
the value of the state and of collaborative efforts. As put by Evans: “Synergy is too potent a 
developmental tool to be ignored by development theories” (1997:205). 
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Appendix 1: Food Insecurity in Odisha 
 
Food security has been mapped according to under-five mortality and child malnutrition rates 
(WFP & IHD 2008:32). 
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Appendix 2: Administrative Units in India  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author’s construct. Sourced from field observations and conversational interviews with 
government officials 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government of India 
State Governments 
Districts 
Blocks 
Gram Panchayats 
Collector 
Civil Supplies Officer (CSO) 
Assistant CSO 
Block Development Officer 
/Inspector of Supplies 
Panchayat Executive 
Officer/ FPS Owner 
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Appendix 3: Interview Guide – Beneficiaries  
 
Introduction 
- Introduce myself and my research project 
- Stress that my work is independent and that I do not work for the WFP or the 
Government 
- Ask for consent to record the interview, stress that anonymity will be protected and that 
the respondent can ask questions or stop the interview anytime 
- Emphasise that there are no right or wrong answers. I am interested in hearing about 
experiences and opinions; what life is like here and what problems the respondents are 
facing. 
 
Questions Responses 
Demographic Information 
1. Gender 
2. Age 
3. Size of household 
4. Level of education (can you read/write?) 
5. Main source of income 
6. BPL/AAY/APL 
 
 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
Local realities 
1. What does it mean to be a daily labourer/farmer/etc.? 
2. Which difficulties do you face in your daily life? How do you cope with 
them? 
3. Would you say you are satisfied with what you do? 
4. Is there any way that you can improve your situation (by getting 
another job, opening a business etc.)? 
5. Do you have access to clean water? Sanitation? Electricity? Credit? 
 
 
1.  
2.  
 
3.  
4.  
 
5.  
 
The food situation 
1. Can you tell me about how your family accesses food? 
2. How many meals do you eat a day?  
3. What type of food do you eat? 
4. Does your family have sufficient food on a daily basis throughout the 
year? 
5. Are there any conflicts over food in your village/within your 
household? 
 
 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
 
5.  
 
TPDS - general information 
1. Which items do you get through TPDS? 
2. How far do you have to travel? 
3. How do you carry your food home? 
4. Do you always collect all the grains that you are entitled to? If not, 
why? 
5. How many days does it take for your household to consume the 
monthly entitlement of rice? 
 
 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
 
5.  
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Perceptions of TPDS 
1. What is your personal opinion on TPDS? 
2. Are you satisfied with the way TPDS works? Why/why not? (Probe on 
quality, quantity, price) 
3. If applicable: Has computerisation improved your experience? 
Why/why not? 
4. Have you personally had any problems with TPDS? 
5. In what way is TPDS improving your livelihood? 
6. Has TPDS equipped your family to cope with new challenges? Do you 
feel that it prepares you to act if something bad happens? 
7. How do you spend the money that is saved by purchasing through 
TPDS? 
8. How would your food situation look without TPDS? 
9. What are your thoughts on replacing TPDS with cash transfers? 
10. Are there any families in your community who are not receiving food 
through TPDS? If so, why? 
11. What is your view of the Government for implementing TPDS? 
 
 
1.  
2.  
 
3.  
 
4.  
5.  
6.  
 
7.  
 
8.  
9.  
10.  
 
11.  
Looking forward 
1. How could TPDS be improved? 
 
 
1.  
 
Is there anything you would like to add, which we haven’t covered? 
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Appendix 4: Interview Guide – Fair Price Shop Owners 
 
Questions Responses 
 
1. Can you please tell me about the TPDS system?  How does it work? 
 
 
 
2. What is your role?  
Can you describe what it means to be a FPS owner? 
 
 
 
 
3. Can you tell me how food typically is distributed? 
 
 
 
4. Is TPDS a sustainable business for you? 
Does it provide you with a sustainable livelihood? 
Do you have any side occupations? 
 
 
 
5. Which business incentives does TPDS give you? 
 
 
 
6. If applicable: Has computerisation improved your business? 
Which challenges and opportunities do you see in computerisation? 
 
 
7. What is your personal opinion on TPDS? 
Would you say that you are satisfied with the way it works? 
 
 
 
 
8. Do you believe TPDS enables people to pull themselves out of 
poverty? 
 
 
 
 
9. What do you think the general opinion in the local community is 
about TPDS? 
 
 
 
 
10. What is your view of the Government for implementing TPDS? 
 
 
 
11. How could TPDS be improved? 
 
 
Is there anything you would like to add, which we haven’t covered? 
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Appendix 5: Interview Record 
 
Interview # District Village HH M/F Date Comments 
Beneficiary_1 Rayagada Pitamahal  M 061112 Rural 
Beneficiary_2 Rayagada Rayagada  M 061112 Urban 
Beneficiary_3 Rayagada Hill village BPL M 071112 Rural 
Beneficiary_4 Rayagada Outskirt village BPL M 081112 Semi-urban 
Beneficiary_5 Khordha Chandaka BPL F 201112 Rural 
Beneficiary_6 Khordha Kantabad BPL M 201112 Rural 
Beneficiary_7 Khordha Daruthenga AAY F 201112 Rural 
Beneficiary_8 Khordha Dhauli BPL F 221112 Rural 
Beneficiary_9 Rayagada Rayagada APL M 051212 Urban 
Beneficiary_10 Rayagada Rayagada AAY M 051212 Urban 
Beneficiary_11 Rayagada Rayagada AAY M 061212 Urban 
Beneficiary_12 Rayagada Rayagada BPL M 061212 Urban 
Beneficiary_13 Rayagada N/A BPL F 061212 No translator 
Beneficiary_14 Rayagada Rayagada BPL F 071212 Urban 
Beneficiary_15 Rayagada Rayagada BPL F 071212 Urban 
Beneficiary_16 Rayagada Rayagada AAY F 071212 Urban 
Beneficiary_17 Rayagada M village BPL M 081212 No translator 
Rural 
Beneficiary_18 Rayagada Suri, Kolnara Block APL F 101212 Rural 
Beneficiary_19 Rayagada Suri, Kolnara Block APL F 101212 No translator 
Rural 
Beneficiary_20 Khordha Patrapada AAY M 121212 Semi-urban 
Beneficiary_21 Khordha Patrapada AAY F 121212 Semi-urban 
Beneficiary_22 Khordha Patrapada BPL F 121212 Semi-urban 
Beneficiary_23 Khordha Nanput  AAY F 121212 Rural 
Beneficiary_24 Khordha Nanput AAY F 121212 Rural 
Beneficiary_25 Khordha Tanando AAY M 121212 Semi-urban 
 
FGD # District Village HH M/F # of 
participants 
Date 
FGD_1 Rayagada Outskirt village BPL + AAY M + F 3 F, 4 M 081112 
FGD_2 Khordha Daruthenga BPL F 3 201112 
FGD_3 Khordha Sisupalgarh BPL + AAY M 7 221112 
FGD_4 Khordha Itipur BPL + AAY F 5 221112 
FGD_5 Rayagada Suri BPL + AAY M + F 30+ 101212 
 
FPS/implementer 
interview # 
District Village M/F Date 
FPS_1 Khordha Daruthenga M 201112 
FPS_2 Khordha Mendhasala M 201112 
FPS_3 Khordha Mendhasala M 201112 
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FPS_4 Khordha Itipur M 221112 
Implementer_1 Rayagada Rayagada M 081112 
 
Conversations  District M/F 
Official_1 Rayagada M 
Official_2 Rayagada F 
Official_3 Khordha F 
Official_4 Khordha M 
Official_5 Khordha M 
Official_6 Cuttack M 
Official_7 Rayagada F 
Official_8 Rayagada M 
 
